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TOBACCO'S WEAKEST LINK:
WHY TOBACCO FARMERS ARE
ESSENTIAL PLAYERS IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST BIG TOBACCO
ANNA R. KUPERSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
The current tobacco control policy in the United States focuses on reducing
the demand for tobacco products through taxation, legislation, cessation, and
education.' In order to be truly comprehensive, our tobacco control policy must
also address the supply side of tobacco 2 by encouraging the reduction of tobacco
Copyright © 2008 by Anna R. Kuperstein.
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Maryland School of Law (Baltimore, MD). B.S., Writing and
Mathematics, 2005, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge, MA). I would like to thank
Professor Kathleen Dachille and the editorial staff of the Journal for their generous help with this article;
Professors Robert Percival and Rena Steinzor for their invaluable guidance; and Edward Barrett,
William Corbett, and Rebecca Faery for their ceaseless encouragement. A final thank you to my family
and friends for all their love and support, without which I would not be where I am today.
1. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a comprehensive tobacco control
approach should apply "educational, clinical, regulatory, economic, and social strategies." CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BEST PRACTICES FOR
COMPREHENSIVE TOBACCO CONTROL PROGRAMS 7 (2007), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/tobacco-control-programs/stateandcommunity/bestpractices/. The goals
of a comprehensive tobacco control program include, inter alia, preventing initiation of smoking,
promoting cessation of smoking, and implementing smoking bans through regulations and laws. Id at
12. New York City has adopted a "Five-Point Tobacco Control Plan," which focuses on taxation, legal
action, cessation, education, and evaluation. Bureau of Tobacco Control, N.Y. City Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene, New York City's Five-Point Tobacco Control Plan,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/smoke/tc9.shtml (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
2. Crystal H. Williamson, Comment, Clearing the Smoke: Addressing the Tobacco Issue as an
International Body, 20 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 587, 615 (2002) (arguing that tobacco regulations should
seek to reduce the consumer demand for tobacco and the supply of tobacco products); see also Arthur B.
LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors, and Public Policy, 26 AM. J. L. & MED. 187, 203 (2000)
(asserting that a major goal of tobacco policy should be to reduce tobacco production and consumption).
But see World Health Org., Interventions to Reduce Tobacco Consumption,
http://www.who.int/tobacco/research/economics/interventions/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2008)
(explaining that measures to reduce tobacco supply are less promising than measures to reduce demand
for tobacco products).
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production3 and establishing a powerful, new partnership between the public health
community and tobacco farmers.
Tobacco farmers remain the forgotten branch of the tobacco industry. In the
flurry surrounding one of the biggest public health epidemics of the twentieth
century,4 tobacco farmers were largely cast aside while being exploited by the
industry5 and neglected in negotiation.6 Nevertheless, farmers remain a critical part
of the industry, and "taking aim at the tobacco companies will unquestionably have
consequences for those farmers."7 The inverse is true as well: taking aim at tobacco
farmers may affect the tobacco industry, as cooperation between the public health
community and the tobacco farmer community would result in a powerful
collaboration that would bolster the fight against big tobacco.8 Rather than using
farmers for target practice, tobacco control activists should consider tobacco
farmers potential allies who can affect change from within the industry.
Part I of this comment will explain that tobacco farmers must be distinguished
from the tobacco industry in order for tobacco control activists to reconcile
working against the tobacco industry but with tobacco farmers. Part L.A will
demonstrate how tobacco farmers can be distinguished from the industry as a
whole, due to their primary role as agricultural workers, the tendency of farmers to
become indebted as a result of the tobacco companies' direct contracting system,
and their lack of intent to deceive the public about the damaging health effects of
tobacco products. Part I.B will identify action taken by the tobacco industry to
weaken the power of tobacco farmers, including preventing farmers from
participating in the negotiations leading up to the Master Settlement Agreement and
effectively thwarting the enactment of the McCain Bill, which would have
3. Williamson, supra note 2, at 615.
4. The recognition of tobacco use as a health hazard is one of the ten great public health
achievements of the United States in the twentieth century. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Ten
Great Public Health Achievements - United States, 1900-1999, 48 MORTALITY & MORBIDITY WKLY.
REP. 241 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm4812.pdf.
5. JUDITH MACKAY & MICHAEL ERIKSEN, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE TOBACCO ATLAS 46
(2002), available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/statistics/tobacco-atlas/en (follow "The Tobacco Atlas"
hyperlink) ("The tobacco industry exploits [farmers] by contributing to their debt burden, while using
their economic plight to argue against efforts to control tobacco.").
6. See infra Part I.B.1.
7. Jamey Pregon, Note, Casualties of the War on Tobacco: Can Farmers Survive the Anti-
Tobacco Onslaught?, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 465, 468 (1998). See also Clara Sue Ross, Comment,
Judicial and Legislative Control of the Tobacco Industry: Toward a Smoke-Free Society?, 56 U. CtN. L.
REV. 317, 331 (1987) ("An alteration in the present favored economic status of tobacco as a crop would
have a negative impact on tobacco farmers.").
8. If a reduction in tobacco supply is to have a meaningful impact, the effort to reduce supply must
be pursued in other countries as well, because American tobacco companies are increasingly moving
production and manufacturing facilities overseas. ERIC N. LINDBLOM, AM. HEART ASS'N, FALSE
FRIENDS: THE U.S. TOBACCO COMPANIES' BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN TOBACCO FARMERS 1 (1999),
available at http://tobaccofreekids.org/reports/falsefriends/campaign.pdf.
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provided market transition assistance for tobacco industry workers and their
communities and given the Food and Drug Administration explicit authority to
regulate tobacco products. Part I.B will also explain that tobacco farmers were
eventually included in a national tobacco policy not through the efforts of the
tobacco industry but through congressional action in the form of the Fair and
Equitable Reform Act of 2004.
Part II will describe a program to phase out tobacco that is tailored to the
needs of tobacco farmers. Part II.A will discuss alternative uses for tobacco, and
part II.B will discuss the existence of alternative crops that may be able to replace
tobacco as a stable cash crop. Part II.B will also dispel the myth that tobacco is the
most profitable crop, demonstrate that many tobacco farmers are already selling
other commodities, and show that, with the proper financial support, many tobacco
farmers are willing to grow alternative crops. Part II.C will explain how excise
taxes on cigarettes can be used to fund the phase-out program, which would
subsidize research on alternative crops, crop diversification efforts, education, and
job training. Finally, part II.C will demonstrate how excise taxes can be used to test
the federal government's true objectives with respect to the tobacco industry.
I. TOBACCO FARMERS: THE ANTI-TOBACCO ACTIVISTS' UNLIKELY ALLIES
Some public health advocates are willing to destroy the livelihoods of tobacco
farmers for the sake of the greater public health.9 To these activists, sacrificing an
estimated 37,013 tobacco farms, 10 in exchange for the lives of millions in the
future," is a simple equation with only one solution: throw tobacco farmers to the
wolves. But allowing farmers to be exterminated by the anti-tobacco bulldozer
ignores the potential for collaboration between two communities that traditionally
have opposed each other: public health advocates and tobacco farmers. 12 To
harness the potential that may come out of such an unlikely relationship, activists
should approach farmers with a modified and less hostile version of the time-
honored military technique of divide and conquer: divide and persuade. Activists
must first divide tobacco farmers from the tobacco industry at large by
9. Pregon, supra note 7, at 493.
10. In 2002, there were 37,013 tobacco farms in the United States. TOM CAPEHART, U. S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., TRENDS IN U.S. TOBACCO FARMING 5 (2004), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/tbs/nov04/tbs25702/tbs25702.pdf.
11. Tobacco is "the world's leading agent of death .... If current trends continue, tobacco will kill
1000 million people prematurely during [the twenty-first] century." Thomas R. Frieden & Michael R.
Bloomberg, How to Prevent 100 Million Deaths from Tobacco, 369 THE LANCET 1758, 1758 (2007).
12. David G. Altman et al., Tobacco Farmers and Diversification: Opportunities and Barriers, 5
TOBACCO CONTROL 192, 197 (1996) ("We believe that health professionals must learn to work more
closely with tobacco farmers and farm organisations, emphasizing their joint interest in
diversification."); MACKAY & ERIKSEN, supra note 5, at 46 ("[P]artnerships are developing between the
farmers and the public health community.").
2008]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
distinguishing farmers from the industry as a whole.1 3 Thereafter, activists must
show tobacco farmers that the industry has not acted in their best interests, which
will further weaken the farmers' trust in the industry and create space for an
alliance between the public health and farmer communities.14
A. Distinguishing Tobacco Farmers from the Tobacco Industry
Before establishing a cooperative relationship with tobacco farmers, the
public health community must first confront the seemingly irreconcilable
contradiction of working against the industry but with the industry's farmers. To do
so, tobacco control activists must distinguish the farmers from the tobacco industry
at large, which is no easy task. Tobacco farmers are an indispensable part of the
industry, as cigarette production "begins with the farmer and ends with the retailer,
with manufacturers in the middle."' 15 Like the rest of the industry, tobacco farmers
"profit from the sale of an addictive drug .... 16
Some scholars believe that tobacco farmers deserve support in part because
"[f]arming as a way of life is central to the image of this country. 1 7 Yet, with
tobacco products endangering the health and lives of millions,' 8 the idea of
supporting tobacco farmers in order to preserve a superficial vision of idyllic rural
life is not sufficiently persuasive. Tobacco farmers should be protected from
becoming "casualties of the war on tobacco"'19 not because they preserve a romantic
picture of American life, but because they operate on a distinctly different level
than the rest of the tobacco industry.20
1. Viewing Tobacco Farmers as Agricultural Workers
Despite the unique role of tobacco in American history and economy,
"tobacco is an agricultural product, grown in much the same fashion as cotton and
corn."
21 Like other crops, tobacco is susceptible to unpredictable natural
13. See infra Part I.A.
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. Pregon, supra note 7, at 468.
16. Donald W. Garner, Tobacco Wars and the New Minority, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 15, 27
(1998).
17. Paul A. LeBel & Richard C. Ausness, Toward Justice in Tobacco Policymaking: A Critique of
Hanson and Logue and an Alternative Approach to the Costs of Cigarettes, 33 GA. L. REv. 693, 800
(1999).
18. Frieden & Bloomberg, supra note 11, at 1758.
19. Pregon, supra note 7, at 494.
20. See id. (arguing that tobacco farmers did not conspire with tobacco companies to knowingly
promote products that caused serious health risks).
21. LaFrance, supra note 2, at 194.
[VOL. 11:103
TOBACCO'S WEAKEST LINK
occurrences. 22 Rainfall, temperature, soil fertility, insects, and a variety of fungal,
viral, and bacterial plant diseases can all affect crop production.23 For many years,
tobacco farmers received protection from natural disasters through a price support
program and a quota system, which were established by the federal government "to
protect farmers from 'uncontrollable natural causes' that affected their operations"
24
and limit the supply of tobacco in the market. Tobacco farmers are not unique in
this respect, as farmers have grown many other crops, including cotton and sugar,
under a government-imposed quota system. As such, tobacco farmers can be
viewed primarily as agricultural workers who face the same problems as other
farmers.
2. Growing Tobacco Involuntarily
Many farmers may be forced into growing tobacco because they are trapped
in a cycle of debt produced by the tobacco companies' contracting system, which
gives tobacco companies excessive control over the farmers' financial success.
26
Under this contracting system, a tobacco company functions as a bank that gives a
farmer credit in the form of seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and technical support at the
beginning of the year. 27 In exchange for this tangible credit, the farmer agrees to
22. See Scott S. Partridge et al., The Use of the Class Action Device in Agricultural Products
Litigation, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 175, 188-93 (2001) (demonstrating that several environmental
conditions affect the growth and production of crops).
23. Id. at 191-92.
24. Matthew Nis Leerberg, Note, Takings and Statutory Entitlements: Does the Tobacco Buyout
Take Quota Rights Without Just Compensation?, 55 DUKE L.J. 865, 868 (2006) ("As part of the
Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA), the federal government instituted a price support and
marketing quota system."). The Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 discontinued the price
support program for tobacco. Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1521 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§
518-19a (2006)); JASPER WOMACH, CONG. RES. SERV., TOBACCO QUOTA BUYOUT at CRS-I (2005),
available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22046.pdf. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
25. ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND
ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS 1933-84, at 5 (1984), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib485/aib485.pdf (documenting the history of using crop quotas
for sugar and cotton). For a history of the origins of the tobacco quota system, see Leerberg, supra note
24.
26. CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO FREE KIDS, GOLDEN LEAF BARREN HARVEST: THE COSTS OF
TOBACCO FARMING 12-16 (2001), available at
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/campaign/globa/FCTCreportl.pdf; WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT ON
THE PUBLIC HEARING ON AGRICULTURAL DIVERSIFICATION AND ALTERNATIVE CROPS TO TOBACCO
FOR THE WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL 3 (2007), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop2/FCTC COP2 _D3-en.pdf. Even tobacco farmers have
acknowledged the "poverty cycle created by debt bondage contracts." Id. Tobacco farmers feel "that the
tobacco industry is attempting to enslave the farmers by eliminating the free market system that the
auctions provided .... CATHERINE SIEBEL ET AL., PRESS COVERAGE OF TOBACCO ISSUES 17 (2002),
available at http://www.impacteen.org/states/generalPDFs/presentations/MSS2002_siebel.pdf.
27. CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO FREE KIDS, supra note 26, at 12.
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sell his crop to that company. 28 At the end of the growing season, the company's
leaf buyers determine the grade or quality of the farmer's tobacco leaf.29 Because
the price of tobacco leaf depends on the grade, the company is essentially able to
set the price of the tobacco.3 ° Often, the company's payment to the farmer is less
than the value of the initial credit, creating a vicious cycle in which farmers fall into
debt, continue growing tobacco in an attempt to repay their debt, and, as a result,
become even further indebted.31 Additionally, almost all direct contracts with
tobacco companies stipulate that farmers assume the production risk of growing
tobacco, including "all loss and damage to the crop due to bad weather." 32 This
stipulation is less kind than the original price support system, which aimed to
protect farmers from "uncontrollable natural causes" that wreaked havoc on their
crops. 33 As a result of this exploitive contracting system, many farmers may be
growing tobacco involuntarily, unable to break free of the cycle of debt.
The problem of tobacco farmer debt is most evident abroad. For example, it is
estimated that thirty-five percent of tobacco growers in Brazil will finish the
harvest in debt. 34 Although farmer indebtedness is particularly pronounced in
developing countries, there is reason to believe that many American farmers are
facing similar problems. Before 2001, "most tobacco was graded by government
inspectors from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), under a
voluntary agreement between farmers and buyers." 35 USDA grading was
considered to be relatively fair because the USDA did not aim to profit from the
system.36 In 2001, the tobacco industry pressured farmers to switch to a contract
system,37 and by 2003 nearly all major cigarette companies were purchasing
tobacco through direct contracts.38 Without the protection of a federal crop
insurance program, many American farmers may fall into the trap laid by the
tobacco companies' contracting system and be forced to grow tobacco
involuntarily.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. CAROLYN DIMITRI, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CONTRACTING IN TOBACCO? CONTRACTS
REViSITED 4 (2003), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/tbs/jun03/tbs25401/tbs254-
01.pdf.
33. Leerberg, supra note 24, at 868.
34. CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO FREE KIDS, supra note 26, at 16.
35. Id. at 14.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. DiMITRI, supra note 32, at 2.
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3. A Difference of Intent
Finally, when it comes to intent, "[a] useful distinction can be drawn among
the agricultural, the manufacturing, and the distribution aspects of the tobacco
industry." 39 It is widely known that "tobacco companies have engaged in deceptive
trade practices," including targeting teenage smokers and "mask[ing] the health
risks associated with their products., 40 The industry's intimate knowledge of the
harms posed by cigarettes arguably puts "manufacturers of cigarettes ... in a more
ambiguous moral position than tobacco [farmers], ' who may not have been aware
of the industry's ultimate objectives:
Tobacco companies, if they were conspiring to promote addiction to
products they knew involved health risks, certainly did not include
tobacco farmers in their plot. There were no memorandums sent to
farmers telling them of the companies' plans to manipulate nicotine
levels in cigarettes to promote addiction. Such decisions, if they were
indeed made by tobacco companies, were far removed from the fields
where tobacco was grown. Tobacco farmers simply grew their crops,
harvested them, and took them to the market to be sold.42
Because tobacco farmers did not engage in the tobacco companies' deceptive
practices, farmers should not "suffer for the sins of the industry. 4 3 Instead, the
tobacco farmer community should be approached as a unique entity that operates
on a distinctly different level than the industry at large.44
B. Persuading Tobacco Farmers to Collaborate with the Public Health
Community
The second step in building a cooperative relationship with tobacco farmers is
to gain the farmers' trust by showing them that the tobacco industry does not have
their best interests in mind.45 By showing farmers that the industry does not, in fact,
39. LeBel & Ausness, supra note 17, at 800.
40. Pregon, supra note 7, at 468; accord United States v. Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 852-53
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding that tobacco companies deliberately deceived consumers about the health risks
of smoking in order to market their products).
41. LeBel & Ausness, supra note 17, at 800.
42. Pregon, supra note 7, at 494.
43. Id. at 493. "If the tobacco companies are at fault here, surely tobacco farmers should not share
the blame." Id. at 494.
44. Id. at 494 (arguing that tobacco farmers did not conspire with tobacco companies to knowingly
promote products that caused serious health risks).
45. See LINDBLOM, supra note 8, at v, 1-3, available at
http://tobaccofreekids.org/reports/falsefriends/campaign.pdf (noting that tobacco manufacturers' trend to
move production across seas and purchase foreign tobacco has increasingly caused family-owned
tobacco farms to disappear). "[T]he bond between the tobacco industry and the tobacco farmer finally is
beginning to break down .... " MACKAY & ERIKSEN, supra note 5, at 46. "[T]he tobacco farmers are
beginning to note situations where their interests diverge from those of the tobacco companies." Allan
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take farmers into consideration, tobacco control activists will be able to weaken the
farmers' loyalty to the industry and persuade farmers to collaborate with the public
health community. To demonstrate the industry's lack of concern for farmers, one
need only look at the industry's recent actions: the industry's exclusion of farmers
from the Master Settlement Agreement negotiations and its strong opposition to the
McCain Bill.
1. The De Facto Exclusion of Tobacco Farmers from the Master Settlement
Agreement
In the late 1990s, several states sued four major tobacco companies "to
recover Medicaid funds spent treating smoking-related illnesses. 46 The states
alleged, inter alia, that the tobacco companies lied about the harmful effects of
smoking and unlawfully targeted children in their advertising.47 The lawsuit
concluded on November 23, 1998 with the signing of the Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA), 48 "an accord ... between the state Attorneys General of forty-
six states, five U.S. territories, the District of Columbia and the four major tobacco
and cigarette producers: Philip Morris Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Lorillard
Tobacco Corp., and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. '49 In exchange for
receiving immunity from further state liability, 50 the participating companies
agreed, inter alia, to change the way tobacco products are marketed, to finance a
$1.5 billion anti-smoking campaign, and to open previously secret industry
documents.5' The companies also agreed to make annual payments to the states in
perpetuity, 52 and it is estimated that the payments made during the first twenty-five
years would have totaled over $206 billion.53
W. Vestal, "Real Partnerships" and Real Problems: Conforming Business Entity Law to Fiscal
Realities and Popular Conceptions, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 889 n.70 (2003). According to a survey
conducted in 1994, only seven percent of tobacco growers believed that tobacco companies usually or
always take growers' interests into account when making decisions. In a Tobacco State of Mind,
LEXINGTON-HERALD LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Sept. 11, 1994, at A1O.
46. Rahul Rajkumar et al., Is the Tobacco Settlement Constitutional?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 748,
748 (2006).
47. Id.
48. C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RES. SERV., RL30058: TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT (1998): OVERVIEW, IMPLEMENTATION BY STATES, AND CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES, at CRS-1
(1999), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshalllcrsreports/crsdocuments/RL30058.pdf.
49. Shital A. Patel, The Tobacco Litigation Merry-Go-Round: Did the MSA Make It Stop?, 8
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 615, 615 (2005).
50. Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen., Master Settlement Agreement, § XII(a), at 90-91 (1998), available
at http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf [hereinafter Master Settlement
Agreement] (follow "Master Settlement Agreement" hyperlink); accord Rajkumar et al., supra note 46,
at 748.
51. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 50, §§ III-IV, VI (a)-(c).
52. Id. § IX(c), at 45-46; accord Rajkumar, supra note 46, at 748.
53. Rajkumar, supra note 46, at 748.
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The MSA does contain a provision referring to tobacco farmers:
[T]he Participating Manufacturers recognize the concern of the tobacco
[farmer] community that it may be adversely affected by the potential
reduction in tobacco consumption resulting from this settlement,
reaffirm their commitment to work cooperatively to address concerns
about the potential adverse economic impact on such community, and
will, within 30 days after the MSA Execution Date, meet with the
political leadership of States with [farmer] communities to address these
economic concerns.54
Despite this formal show of support, it has been suggested that the tobacco
industry refused to include a funding provision for farmers in the MSA.55 In fact,
the MSA itself did not allocate any funds to be given specifically to tobacco
farmers. 56 And although the tobacco manufacturers confirmed their desire to work
with local governments at the negotiation table,57 it has been suggested that the
industry excluded tobacco growers from those very negotiations. 58 The farmers'
collective interests were not "represented at the bargaining table, and their
objectives were never factored into the original settlement." 59 Tobacco farmers
were "excluded from the negotiations and were ... the ultimate losers.,
60
The industry did, however, take action on July 19, 1999. 61 In accordance with
the MSA provision regarding farmers, the tobacco companies voluntarily worked
with tobacco-growing states to establish the National Tobacco Growers Settlement
Trust Fund, also known as the "Phase II" settlement fund.62 The companies agreed
to contribute $5.15 billion on a market-share basis into the trust fund over the
course of twelve years. 63 The MSA was predicted to have a negative impact on
54. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 50, § I, at 1-2.
55. Colloquy, Dr. Ron Davis, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485,489 (1998).
56. Jasper Womach, CONG. RES. SERV., TOBACCO QUOTA BUYOUT PROPOSALS
IN THE 108TH CONGRESS, at n.7 (2004), available at
http://www.uky.edu/Ag/TobaccoEcon/publications/womach rl31790.pdf.
57. Williamson, supra note 2, at 603.
58. David S. Samford, Note, Cutting Deals in Smoke-F ed Free Rooms: A Case Study in Public
Choice Theory, 87 KY. L.J. 845, 865 (1999); Pregon, supra note 7, at 484. One factor contributing to the
exclusion of farmers from negotiations was their disorganized nature. After decades of successfully
fighting legislation and litigation, the tobacco industry was "actively organized and effective enough to
participate in the tobacco negotiations." Samford, supra, at 861-62. Unlike the industry, tobacco farmer
groups like the Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperation Association suffered from organizational
problems and, thus, were not prepared to participate effectively in the settlement negotiations. Id. at
866-67.
59. Samford, supra note 58, at 865.
60. Id. at 883. Dr. Ron Davis, former Director of the Centers for Disease Control's Office on
Smoking and Health, suggests that the tobacco growers were excluded from the settlement at the
insistence of the tobacco industry. Colloquy, supra note 55, at 489.
61. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 248.701 (West 2007).
62. REDHEAD, supra note 48, at CRS-5 to CRS-6, CRS-6 n.9.
63. Id. at CRS-6.
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cigarette consumption, and the goal of the fund was to provide farmers with
compensation for their expected decrease in earnings. 64
One wonders why it took the tobacco industry so long to offer farmers
support in the form of the Phase II settlement fund. In light of the industry's
otherwise consistent pattern of excluding the farmers, it is not difficult to believe
that the Phase II payments were simply a political maneuver designed to improve
the industry's image. The exclusion of farmers from the MSA negotiations
undoubtedly weakened the farmers' already damaged relationship with the
industry.65
2. The Inclusion of Tobacco Farmers in a National Tobacco Policy
After being excluded from the MSA negotiations by the tobacco industry,
tobacco farmers began to draw attention from Congress. There were various
attempts to incorporate farmers into a national tobacco control policy, including the
unsuccessful McCain Bill, and the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act, which
was enacted in 2004.66
a. A Failed Legislative Effort: The McCain Bill
In order to "remedy the initial omission of farmers" from the MSA, several
Senators introduced proposals to reform the tobacco price support program.67 On
May 18, 1998, Senator John McCain introduced the National Tobacco Policy and
Youth Smoking Reduction Act, commonly known as the "McCain Bill. ' 68 Most
notably, the McCain Bill would have given the Food and Drug Administration
explicit authority to regulate tobacco products. 69 The bill also included the Long-
Term Economic Assistance for Farmers Act (LEAF Act), which would have
64. Id. at CRS-5.
65. "The alliance between the industry and other pro-tobacco groups, however, was not exactly
built upon mutual trust." Samford, supra note 58, at 862. Over the past five years, tobacco farmers have
become more aware of the "situations where their interests diverge from those of the tobacco
companies." Vestal, supra note 45, at 889 n.70 (citation omitted).
66. See infra Part I.B.2.a-b.
67. Pregon, supra note 7, at 484. Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana proposed a bill, the Tobacco
Transition Act, which would phase out the tobacco price support and quota programs. S.1313, 105th
Cong. (1997). Senator Wendell Ford of Kentucky proposed a bill, The Long-Term Economic Assistance
for Farmers Act, which would provide "market transition assistance for tobacco producers, tobacco
industry workers, and their communities." S.1310, 105th Cong. (1997). For a comparison of several bills
that proposed to reform the tobacco price support program, see JASPER WOMACH, CONG. RES. SERV.,
COMPENSATING FARMERS FOR THE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT at CRS-5 to CRS-6 (1998),
http://assets.opencrs.comi/rpts/98- 133_ 19980706.pdf.
68. S.1415, 105th Cong. (1998); Garner, supra note 16, at 15.
69. S.1415 § 3.
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provided market transition assistance for tobacco producers, tobacco industry
workers, and their communities.
70
The LEAF Act allocated $28.5 billion for economic development grants for
communities dependent on tobacco, tobacco worker transition assistance, and
educational grants for members of tobacco farm families. 71 The Act arranged for
the fund to be financed by tobacco manufacturers on a market share basis, with
$2.1 billion contributed annually between 1999 and 2008, and $500 million
contributed annually from 2009 to 2023.72 Unfortunately, at the last minute, the
tobacco industry not only withdrew its support for the McCain Bill, 73 but launched
a $40 million advertising campaign directed against it.74 On June 17, 1998, the
McCain Bill was defeated in the Senate. 
75
While the size and scope of the McCain Bill were problematic, 76 the tobacco
industry's opposition to the bill was a significant, if not the determinative, factor in
its demise. President Clinton, who had lobbied for the McCain Bill, 77 attributed the
bill's defeat to the advertising campaign launched by the tobacco companies.
78
Additionally, a simple analysis of campaign contributions reveals the link between
the mostly Republican Senators who voted against the McCain Bill and the tobacco
industry. 79 The fifty-seven Senators who voted in support of the bill received only
70. Id. §§ 1001-41.
71. Id. "Perhaps the most stunning provision in the LEAF Act was funding for the college
education of tobacco farmers and their (quite expansively defined) extended families." Garner, supra
note 16, at 15 n.33. For the text of the provision in the LEAF Act providing educational funding for
members of a tobacco farm family, see S. 1415 §§ 1012(5), 1032.
72. S. REP. 1NO. 105-180, at 49-50 (1998), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105 congreports&docid=f:srl80.105.pdf. See also S.1415 § 1012.
73. Pregon, supra note 7, at 484.
74. Id. at 484 n. 147 ("After rescinding support for the settlement, the five major tobacco companies
embarked on a $ 40 million advertising blitz in opposition to the McCain bill.") (citing John F. Harris &
Ceci Connolly, Clinton Suffers Major Defeat on Tobacco, WASH. POST, June 18, 1998, at A. 19).
75. MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO
POLITICS 122, 129 (2d ed. 2005).
76. Even Senator John Kerry, an anti-tobacco advocate, admitted that the McCain Bill "got a little
too big and too convoluted." Major Garrett, Congress Snuffs Out the Tobacco Bill, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., June 29, 1998, at 32. The McCain Bill became unwieldy after losing its original focus and
gaining opponents along the way. Samford, supra note 58, at 890.
77. Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Special Reports Year in Review 1998 (1998),
http://tobaccofreekids.org/reports/yearsinreview/ 1 998inreview.shtml.
78. David E. Rosenbaum, The Tobacco Bill: The Overview; Senate Drops Tobacco Bill with '98
Revival Unlikely; Clinton Lashes Out at G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1998, at Al.
79. TOBACCO-FREE KIDS ACTION FUND, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS BY TOBACCO INTERESTS ANNUAL REPORT 1-2 (2006), available at
http://tobaccofreeaction.org/contributions/september2006/september2006.pdf. In 1998, the Campaign
for Tobacco-Free Kids, an organization devoted to preventing tobacco use by children, filed a complaint
with the Federal Election Commission alleging that major United States tobacco companies violated
federal election laws by making illegal corporate campaign contributions (in the form of political
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$4,810, on average, from the industry, while the forty-two Senators who voted
against the McCain Bill received, on average, $17,902 from the industry.
80
b. The Successful Legislative Effort: The Fair and Equitable Tobacco
Reform Act of 2004 (FETRA or The Buyout)
In the late 1990s, demand for cigarettes continued to decline due to, in part,
the MSA and state efforts to curb tobacco use. 81 The tobacco farmer community
acknowledged the mounting difficulties faced by tobacco farmers and chose to
support Congress' next great proposal to reform the tobacco price program: the Fair
and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 (FETRA), 2 otherwise known as "the
buyout. ''83 FETRA ended the tobacco quota system and the price support program,
transitioned the farmers into a free-market system, 84 and established the Tobacco
Transition Payment Program, which provided for a buyout of tobacco farmers'
property interests. 85 FETRA also triggered an MSA clause that ended Phase II
payments from the tobacco companies to farmers. 86 In the end, tobacco growers
were finally incorporated into a national tobacco control policy not through the
efforts of the tobacco industry, but through Congressional legislation.
advertisements) to Republican Senators. David E. Rosenbaum, New Attack on Cigarette Makers, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1998, at A12.
80. TOBACCO-FREE KIDS ACTION FUND, supra note 79, at 21.
81. H. FREDERICK GALE, JR. ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., TOBACCO
AND THE ECONOMY: FARMS, JOBS, AND COMMUNITIES 7-8 (2000), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer789/AER789.PDF. In a report published in 2000, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service estimated that domestic demand for cigarettes
would decline seventeen percent between 1998 and 2008. Id. at 11. In a 2002 report, the World Health
Organization predicted that tobacco consumption in the U.S. would decline ten to nineteen percent
between 1998 and 2008. MACKAY & ERIKSEN, supra note 5, at 88-89. For an example of how efforts to
curb tobacco use at the state level contributed to decline in cigarette consumption, see Elizabeth Gilpin
et al., What Contributed to the Major Decline in Per Capita Cigarette Consumption During California 's
Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programme?, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL 308, 312 (2006).
82. Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1521 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 518-19a (2006)).
83. Farm Service Agency, United States Department of Agriculture, Tobacco Transition Payment
Program, http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subject-toba&topic=landing (last visited
Feb. 12, 2008); Tobacco Transition Payment Program, 7 C.F.R. § 1463 (2005).
84. 7 U.S.C. § 51 8a. "[1]nternal divisions within the growers' community were compounded by the
prospect of a federal tobacco allotment buy-out." Samford, supra note 58, at 867. While older farmers
ready to retire supported the buyout, younger farmers were more concerned about the long-term effects
of a one-time buyout. Id. at 889 n.285.
85. 7 U.S.C. § 518b.
86. Id. § 518a ("The Secretary shall offer to enter into a contract with each tobacco quota holder
under which the tobacco quota holder shall be entitled to receive payments under this section in
exchange for termination of tobacco marketing quotas and related price support ...."); accord State v.
Philip Morris USA Inc., 618 S.E.2d 219, 221-23 (N.C. 2005).
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II. PHASING OUT TOBACCO FARMING
If tobacco farmers are willing to reduce production of tobacco, the public
health community must uphold its end of the bargain. Calling for the
discontinuation of tobacco production without providing farmers with assistance to
transition out of growing tobacco would be irresponsible and impractical. Instead,
the public health community must approach tobacco farmers with a well-developed
phase-out program that is tailored to the needs of tobacco farmers. A
comprehensive phase-out program would use an excise tax on cigarettes to fund
research on alternative crops, subsidies for crop diversification, and education and
training for farmers seeking to pursue off-farm careers.
A. Alternative Uses for Tobacco
Before committing to a complete elimination of tobacco, it is worthwhile to
examine alternative uses for the crop.87 Academic institutions like the Tobacco and
Health Research Institute at the University of Kentucky in Lexington and North
Carolina State University in Raleigh are paving the way in alternative use studies. 
88
At the heart of alternative use research is the discovery that the genes of tobacco
plants can be genetically engineered to express a variety of proteins, enzymes, and
polymers. 89 Researchers at the University of Kentucky describe tobacco as a
"super-rich petri dish" that can be used to "produce everything from antibiotics to
sugars to industrial enzymes. " 9° Researchers are starting to use tobacco plants as
"hosts for bioengineering processes," which means that tobacco plants could soon
be used to make vaccines, cancer treatments, and even blood substitutes. 91 Tobacco
plants could even be used to "clean up contaminated areas around weapons
factories ... just by being grown in the contaminated dirt.",92
Although tobacco grown for biotechnology purposes does not demand as high
a price as tobacco grown for cigarette manufacturing, tobacco grown for
biotechnology purposes needs only about one month to grow, while tobacco grown
87. Brandy E. Fisher, Turning Over a New Leaf 107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A 206, A 206 (1999),
available at http://www.ehponline.org/docs/1999/107-4/innovations.html ("Anticipating a diminishing
market for cigarettes and other such tobacco products in the future, researchers around the United States
are studying alternative uses for tobacco plants. If the research comes to fruition, perhaps tobacco
farmers may not have to change their occupation, just their customers.").
88. Id. at A 207.
89. Id.
90. Jeff Worley, UK's Tobacco and Health Institute Branching Out: Tobacco as a "Factory" to
Grow New Products, ODYSSEY (U. of Ky., Ky.), Spring 1998, at 3, 3, available at
http://www.research.uky.edu/odyssey/spring98/tobacco.html.
91. CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, POSSIBLE HEALTHY AND CONSTRUCTIVE USES FOR
TOBACCO LEAF 1 (2000), available at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0107.pdf.
92. Id.
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for traditional purposes has a growing cycle of about four months. 93 Additionally,
an acre of farmland can support only 6,000 tobacco plants grown for cigarette
manufacturing, but the same acre can support up to 100,000 tobacco plants grown
for biotechnology purposes.
94
B. Alternative Crops
For many years, scholars touted tobacco as the most profitable cash crop in
existence. Recently, however, researchers have demonstrated that the labor-
intensive nature of tobacco farming and the high cost of initial capital inputs reduce
the profitability of tobacco.95 Furthermore, Green Tobacco Sickness regularly
impairs tobacco farmers, which affects the availability of labor.96 And with the
tobacco industry shifting manufacturing and production facilities overseas, tobacco
is quickly losing its appeal as a stable cash crop.97 As the value of tobacco declines,
tobacco farmers can cushion their financial loss by diversifying their commodities
and growing alternative crops. 98 One way to encourage farmers to reduce tobacco
production is to fund alternative crop research and subsidize diversification
efforts.99
1. Is Tobacco the Most Profitable Crop? The Pervasive Myth
Before farmers can be persuaded to abandon tobacco in favor of alternative
crops, tobacco control activists must dispel the myth perpetuated by the tobacco
industry, legal scholars, politicians, and various organizations that there is no crop
more profitable than tobacco. Tobacco has been praised as an economically
appealing crop because of its high per-acre return and stable market.' 00 In the past,
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
98. "[H]ealth professionals must learn to work more closely with tobacco farmers and farm
organizations, emphasizing their joint interest in diversification." Altman et al., supra note 12, at 197.
The World Health Organization has identified alternative crop production as an important focus if
tobacco farmers are to be convinced to leave tobacco. Article 17 of the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control is the "[p]rovision of support for economically viable alternative activities" and states:
"Parties shall, in cooperation with each other and with competent international and regional
intergovernmental organizations, promote, as appropriate, economically viable alternatives for tobacco
workers, growers and, as the case may be, individual sellers." WORLD HEALTH ORG., FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL 16 (reprint 2005) (2003), available at
http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/WHOFCTC-english.pdf.
99. Altman et al., supra note 12, at 197 (emphasizing the need for collaboration between health
professionals and tobacco farmers, particularly in the area of crop diversification).
100. Pregon, supra note 7, at 469-70; Ross, supra note 7, at 331; Lucien J. Dhooge, Smoke Across
the Waters: Tobacco Production and Exportation as International Human Rights Violations, 22
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 355, 355 (1998); UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., ECONOMIC
[VOL. 11 : 103
TOBACCO'S WEAKEST LINK
both the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Bank
encouraged growing tobacco as a cash crop.' 0' At one time during his presidency,
even President Clinton claimed that there was "no known crop with the same
income per acre [as tobacco].' ' 2 Predictably, the International Tobacco Growers'
Association claims that tobacco is the most profitable crop per unit of land out of
tobacco, beans, maize, and dairy, 10 3 and, as of 2007, the industry still claims that
tobacco is the best profitable crop. 104
In recent years, the MSA and state efforts to curb tobacco use have
contributed to a decline in the value of American tobacco.' 0 5 Making tobacco
farming less appealing is the growing acknowledgment that the short-term gains of
tobacco farming are likely to be outweighed by the long-term costs. 1 6 Although
tobacco is a profitable crop, its economic appeal is reduced by the high cost of
initial inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, and equipment.' 7 Additionally, tobacco
farming is extremely labor intensive, and high labor costs further reduce the
profitability of the crop. 10 8 Consequently, although tobacco yields higher income
per acre, other crops may yield higher cost-benefit ratios when all the costs of
tobacco farming are taken into account. 109
Tobacco farming also presents a unique hazard: Green Tobacco Sickness
(GTS)."O GTS is an acute nicotine poisoning that occurs when farmers handle the
leaves of mature tobacco plants by hand-harvesting, cutting, or loading the
ROLE OF TOBACCO PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS IN COUNTRIES DEPENDING ON TOBACCO AS A MAJOR
SOURCE OF INCOME 16 (1995), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/pocomd63.en.pdf.
101. ACTION ON SMOKING & HEALTH, FACTSHEET No: 21: TOBACCO IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
(2001), available at http://oldash.org.uk/html/factsheets/pdfs/fact21 .pdf.
102. CNN.com, Clinton Talks with Tobacco Farmers (April 9, 1998), available at
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/l 998/04/09/clinton.tobacco/transcript.html.
103. INT'L TOBACCO GROWERS ASS'N, TOBACCO IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (2d ed. 1996),
available at http://www.forces.org/assorted/tob-dev.htm.
104. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 26, at 4 23. "[T]he arguments of ... the tobacco industry
that tobacco is the best profitable crop are still not based on strong scientific research." Id.
105. See sources cited supra note 81.
106. ACTION ON SMOKING & HEALTH, supra note 101. INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV.,
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993: INVESTING IN HEALTH 89, 89 (1993), available at
http://www.dcp2.org/file/62/WorldDevelopmentReportl993.pdf. According to the World Health
Organization, "tobacco increases the poverty of individuals and families." WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
TOBACCO AND POVERTY: A VICIOUS CIRCLE 4 (2004), available at
http://www.who.int/tobacco/communications/events/wntd/2004/en/wntd2OO4-brochure-en.pdf.
107. CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, supra note 26, at 19.
108. Id.
109. Id.; accord T-W Hu et al., China at the Crossroads: The Economics of Tobacco and Health, 15
TOBACCO CONTROL (Supp.) i37, i38 -i39 (2006).
110. Jeffrey S. McBride et al., Green Tobacco Sickness, 7 TOBACCO CONTROL 294, 294 (1998);
Robert McKnight & Henry Spiller, Green Tobacco Sickness in Children and Adolescents, 120 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 602, 602 (2005), available at
http://www.publichealthreports.org/userfiles/120_6/120602.pdf.
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plants."' Symptoms of GTS may include headache and nausea followed by
vomiting, diarrhea, fluctuations in blood pressure or heart rate, abdominal cramps,
abnormal temperature, dizziness, muscle weakness, and insomnia. "12 The onset of
GTS can occur anywhere from three to seventeen hours after exposure to nicotine,
and the illness can last from one to three days."13 Although the symptoms of GTS
are not long lasting, they can be debilitating."14 Unfortunately, data on the
prevalence of the illness are still limited," 5 and very little widespread action has
been taken to reduce the risk of GTS. 11
6
A final incentive to abandon growing tobacco in the United States is the
industry's increasing reliance on developing countries for production and
manufacturing."17 Tobacco companies are attracted to developing countries for a
variety of reasons, including cheaper labor, easy access to natural resources," l 8 the
relative lack of regulation, and the proximity to the source of tobacco, which is
increasingly being grown overseas."19 Once the world's second largest tobacco
producer, the United States now accounts for only seven percent of global tobacco
production. 120 Growing tobacco is no longer as lucrative or attractive an enterprise
as it once was.
2. Alternative Crops to Tobacco
Researchers throughout the world are seeking reliable alternatives to tobacco.
Investigators at Virginia State University and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University conducted a study of over thirty potential alternative crops,
111. McBride et al., supra note 110, at 294-95; Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Green
Tobacco Sickness in Tobacco Harvesters - Kentucky, 1992, 42 MORTALITY & MORBIDITY WKLY. REP.
237,238 (1993), available at http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/PDF/wk/mm4213.pdf.
112. McBride et al., supra note 110, at 294-95; University of Connecticut Health Center, Identifying
Green Tobacco Sickness in Farmworkers (July 2002), http://www.oehc.uchc.edu/news/new0702.htm
(last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
113. McBride et al., supra note 110, at 295.
114. Id. at 296.
115. T. A. Arcury et al., Predictors of Incidence and Prevalence of Green Tobacco Sickness Among
Latino Farmworkers in North Carolina, USA, 55 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 818, 818
(2001).
116. McBride et al., supra note 110, at 297.
117. JASPER WOMACH, CONG. RES. SERV., U.S. TOBACCO PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, AND
EXPORT TRENDS, at CRS-2 (2003) (explaining that domestic production of tobacco is steadily declining
and is projected to decrease). See generally LINDBLOM, supra note 8.
118. CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR TOBACCO CONTROL, TOBACCO FARMING AND TOBACCO GROWERS 5
(2007), http://www.cctc.ca/cctcIEN/mediaroom/backgrounderfarming.
119. Ross Hammond, Consolidation in the Tobacco Industry, 7 TOBACCO CONTROL 426, 426
(1998).
120. CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, supra note 26, at 6 (demonstrating that production of
tobacco in the United States is falling at the same time as production in developing countries is rising).
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including apricot, basil, cotton, onion, quinoa (a type of grain), and soybean.' 21
Crops varied in their success: while apricot and quinoa were not well adapted to the
area, canola and the adzuki bean were identified as potential new cash crops. 1
22
Another study at the University of Wisconsin focused on Echinacea, an herb sold in
the herbal medicinal market as an immune system booster. 123 The study observed
that tobacco equipment can be used to plant the herb, but that the herb may not be a
dependable alternative crop due to its price volatility. 124 A 2006 study done in
China concluded that tobacco does not produce the best economic return and that
mulberry, rice, wheat, and vegetable oil each yielded a higher net profit than
tobacco.25 Another study, conducted in India, found that the "gross income from a
hectare of tobacco is twenty-two percent higher than for an alternative crop like
safflower .... 126 However, after factoring in the production costs of growing
tobacco, safflower farming was found to yield seventeen percent more profit. 27
Other organizations have made detailed descriptions of various alternative
crops available on the Internet. The USDA National Agricultural Library provides
a list of resources regarding alternative crops and enterprises for small farm
diversification. 128 The website of the New Crop Opportunities Center of the
University of Kentucky provides specific information about. various crops,
including the market outlook, economic considerations, labor requirements, pest
management, and recommendations on harvest and storage. 129 Washington State
University Island County Extension runs a similar website profiling many crops.' 
30
The Appropriate Technology Transfer for Rural Areas (ATTRA) or National
Sustainable Agriculture Information Service, operating under a grant from the
121. H.L. Bhardwaj et al., Alternative Crops Research in Virginia, in PROGRESS IN NEW CROPS 87,
88 tbl. 1 (Jules Janick ed., 1996) available at http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/proceedings1996/v3-
087.html.
122. Id.
123. DON SCHUSTER & RICK KLEMME, CTR. FOR INTEGRATED AGRIC. SYS., UNIV. OF WIS.-
MADISON, ECHINACEA AS A TOBACCO CROP ALTERNATIVE? 1-2, available at
http://www.cias.wisc.edu/pdf/echinace.pdf
124. Id. at 5.
125. T-W Hu et al., supra note 109, at i38-i39.
126. CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, supra note 26, at 19.
127. Id.
128. U.S. Dep't of Agric., Alternative Farming Sys. Info. Ctr., List of Alternative Crops and
Enterprises for Small Farm Diversification (July 18, 2006),
http://www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/pubs/altlist.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
129. Univ. of Ky., New Crop Opportunities Ctr., Crop Profiles,
http://www.uky.edu/Ag/NewCrops/intro.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
130. Wash. State Univ. Island County, Specialty Crops Information Sheets (Oct. 1998),
http://www.island.wsu.edu/CROPS/index.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
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USDA Rural Business-Cooperative Service,' 3' also provides a table of information
about non-traditional crops.132
The World Health Organization (WHO) has joined in the effort to find
alternative crops through the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC),
an international treaty that aims to improve global public health by promoting
global cooperation on tobacco control policies.' 33 Article 17 of the FCTC is the
"provision of support of economically viable alternative activities" and states:
"Parties shall, in cooperation with each other and with competent international and
regional intergovernmental organizations, promote, as appropriate, economically
viable alternatives for tobacco workers, growers and, as the case may be, individual
sellers."'134 In accordance with this provision, the WHO established a study group
on alternative crops during the first session of the Conference of the Parties to the
WHO FCTC held in Switzerland in 2006,135 and the study group was charged with
examining alternative crops and livelihoods, particularly in countries that are
dependent on tobacco production.' 
36
In February of 2007, the WHO held a public hearing in Brazil on agricultural
diversification and alternative crops.' 37 At the hearing, tobacco farmer associations,
tobacco control activists, governmental departments, research organizations, and
academic bodies from around the world presented their views on diversification. 1
38
The issue of diversification was later addressed at the second session of the
Conference of the Parties to the WHO FCTC in Thailand in 2007, where delegates
from 145 parties gathered to consider provisions on exposure to tobacco smoke, the
elimination of illicit trade, and the packaging and labeling of tobacco products. 139 A
131. Appropriate Tech. Transfer for Rural Areas, Nat'l Sustainable Agric. Info. Serv., Who We Are,
http://attra.ncat.org/who.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
132. PATRICIA SAUER & PRESTON SULLIVAN, APPROPRIATE TECH. TRANSFER FOR RURAL AREAS,
ALTERNATIVE AGRONOMIC CROPS 3 (2000), available at http://attra.ncat.org/attra-
pub/PDF/altcrops.pdf.
133. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 98, at 1-3.
134. Id. at 16.
135. WORLD HEALTH ORG., MATTERS IDENTIFIED IN DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE CONFERENCE OF
THE PARTIES THAT CALL FOR ACTION IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN ITS FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS 1
(2007), available at http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop2/FCTCCOP21 11-en.pdf.
136. World Health Org., Highlights of the First Tobacco Treaty Conference of the Parties (Feb. 17,
2006), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/notes/2006/npO3/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 12,
2008).
137. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 26, at 1.
138. Id. at2.
139. World Health Org., WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control - Second Session of
Conference of the Parties (2007),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2007/fctc bangkok/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008);
see also World Health Org., Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, Second Session, Agenda (July 3, 2007),
http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop2/FCTCCOP2_ IRev I -en.pdf (demonstrating that a discussion on
alternative crops was on the hearing agenda).
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summary of the public hearing that took place in Brazil was presented at the second
session of the conference, which indicated that tobacco farmers are concerned
about finding stable alternative livelihoods and that more research is necessary in
this area. 1
40
3. Willingness of Farmers to Try Alternative Crops and Enterprises
Several studies have demonstrated that tobacco farmers are interested in
growing alternative crops or using other activities to supplement income from
growing tobacco. As early as 1996, an American study demonstrated that there was
substantial interest among tobacco farmers in alternative crops or ventures. 141
Studies conducted in Kenya, India, and Bangladesh have produced similar
findings. 1
42
Interestingly, American farmers have already been exploring alternative crops
to supplement their income from tobacco farming. In 1996, the majority of tobacco
farms were already diversified: eighty-two percent of farms growing flue-cured
tobacco sold at least one other commodity, and forty-two percent of flue-cured
tobacco farms sold four or more other commodities. 143 And in a 1998 study, ninety-
five percent of tobacco farmers surveyed were growing or raising a commodity
other than tobacco. 144 In the Suwannee Valley in northern Florida, farmers have
been exploring alternative crops for the past ten to fifteen years, and their
140. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 26, at 2-3.
141. Altman et al., supra note 12, at 195 ("Half of [interviewed farmers] had done something to
learn about on-farm alternatives to tobacco, had an interest in trying other on-farm ventures to
supplement tobacco income, and had found alternatives that were profitable.").
142. In a case study in Kenya, "[a]ll of the interviewed tobacco farmers indicated a willingness to
shift to alternative crops, with 90% stating they would shift immediately." WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra
note 135, at 9. A study conducted in India from 1996 to 2000 involved an action intervention in the
village of Sidnal. Research for Int'l Tobacco Control, Economics of Shifting from Tobacco: A Micro-
Level Study and Action Programme, http://archive.idrc.ca/ritc/india.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
Tobacco farmers were provided seeds for an alternative crop, buffaloes for dairy farming, and financial
assistance. Id. In the first year of the intervention, tobacco cultivation was reduced by half, and fifty-four
percent of the farmers shifted to alternative crops or activities. Id. Tobacco farmers in Bangladesh also
participated in a government program that encourages farmers to produce alternative crops; they assured
the health minister of Bangladesh that if the government provides financial support, they would stop
tobacco production. Tobacco Farmers to Get Micro Credit to Produce Alternative Crop, DAILY NEWS
MONITORING SERVICE, Mar. 17, 2005, available at http://www.bangladesh-
web.com/view.php?hidDate=2005-0317&hidType=BAE&hidRecord=37774.
143. GALE ET AL., supra note 81, at 19 tbl.8, 30.
144. David G. Altman et al., Predictors of Crop Diversification: A Survey of Tobacco Farmers in
North Carolina (USA), 7 TOBACCO CONTROL 376, 379 (1998). The study also found that sixty percent
of the farmers surveyed reported that either the farmers themselves or a member of their family who
lived on the farm had taken action to learn more about supplementing their tobacco income. Id. "Actions
included such things as requesting written material about supplementing their tobacco income, attending
a meeting about supplementation, and attending a farm demonstration of supplemental crops or
methods." Id. Additionally, twenty-six percent of the farmers surveyed had applied for loans, grants, or
other money to support efforts to supplement their tobacco income. Id.
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dependence on tobacco has declined. 145 With many farmers already interested in
diversification, it may not be difficult to persuade them to explore alternatives to
tobacco farming.
C. A Phase-Out Program Tailored to the Needs of Tobacco Farmers
Traditionally, agricultural workers receive assistance when new government
policies affect their industries, and tobacco farmers should be no different., 46 If
tobacco control activists seek the gradual termination of tobacco production, a
program to phase out tobacco farming should include subsidies to support tobacco
farmers through the transitional period. 147 A transitional subsidy can be funded
through an excise tax on cigarettes, which can benefit both farmers and the public
health. Finally, the public health community can use the government's willingness
to levy excise taxes as a litmus test of the government's true objectives with regard
to the tobacco industry.
1. Funding Alternative Crop Research and Subsidizing Crop
Diversification, Education, and Job Training
To transition out of growing tobacco as seamlessly as possible, farmers need
"an alternate means of income comparable to the income created by tobacco
production. 1 48 But the search for a stable cash crop to replace tobacco is far from
over, 149 as evidenced by ongoing research being conducted by academic institutions
such as Virginia State University and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, governmental bodies such as the USDA, and inter-governmental
organizations such as the WHO. 150 Because existing research does not provide
sufficient guidance on viable alternatives to tobacco, the federal government of the
United States should assist in the search for suitable alternative crops by funding
further research on crop diversification. 151 Once stable alternative crops are
identified, tobacco farmers should receive financial assistance as they replace
tobacco with other crops.'
52
145. Univ. of Fla., N. Fla. Research & Educ. Ctr., Alternative Vegetable Crops,
http://nfrec.ifas.ufl.edu/altemativecrops.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
146. LeBel & Ausness, supra note 17, at 802.
147. Id. at 792 (explaining that subsidies can be used to encourage cooperation and alleviate the
damage inflicted on the population suffering from harm).
148. Williamson, supra note 2, at 615.
149. "[T]he issues of growing, diversification and substitution cannot be resolved in a short period of
time. Indeed, it will involve an extensive process of work, research and consultations with different
stakeholders and experts in order to reach viable solutions on the issue of farming . WORLD
HEALTH ORG., supra note 26, at 4.
150. See supra Part 11.B.2.
151. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 135, at 13-19.
152. The United States Department of Agriculture recognizes that farmers may need assistance with
growing alternative or supplemental crops. GALE ET AL., supra note 81, at 30.
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Additionally, we should not exclude the possibility that some tobacco farmers
may want to stop farming altogether and pursue different careers. 153 Those who
decide to pursue a new profession should receive subsidies 154 to help with
"developing skills and education through community colleges, trade schools, GED
course work, or other training programs."' 155 Providing funding for career
transitions will further encourage farmers to leave tobacco in favor of a new
enterprise.
2. Funding the Transitional Subsidy with an Excise Tax on Cigarettes
In the United States, an excise tax on cigarettes could be used to fund research
on alternative crops and alternative livelihoods for tobacco farmers.' 56 Excise tax
revenues could also enable the USDA to help tobacco-growing states provide
assistance to tobacco farmers in transitioning from growing tobacco to growing
other crops or pursuing different occupations altogether.1
57
Using an excise tax offers additional benefits. An excise tax on cigarettes
could forge a stronger bond between farmers and public health advocates 158 by
benefiting farmers' 59 while reducing smoking rates. 160 An excise tax would advance
the goals of both groups, thus aligning the interests of two traditionally conflicting
groups. 16 1 Additionally, one study has shown that a majority of Americans
"believe[] that the government should help farmers make a living other than
153. Id. at 31. "While it is politically prudent to identify alternative livelihoods for tobacco farmers,
one should not assume these would be in agriculture." Derek Yach & Douglas Bettcher, Globalisation of
Tobacco Industry Influence and New Global Responses, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 206, 210 (2000).
154. LeBel & Ausness, supra note 17, at 802.
155. GALE ETAL.,supra note 81, at 31.
156. Gregory D. Bassuk, Note, Advertising Rights and Industry Fights: A Constitutional Analysis of
Tobacco Advertising Restrictions in a Federal Legislative Settlement of Tobacco Industry Litigation, 85
GEO. L.J. 715, 745 (1997).
157. Id.
158. See Altman et al., supra note 12, at 196 ("Data from this study suggest that farmers and health
professionals have reason to establish dialogue around diversification and using excise taxes to fund
diversification.").
159. Id. ("[T]he level of taxation will have a greater effect on the industry income than on farmer
income."); see also CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, STATE CIGARETTE TAx INCREASES WILL
NOT HURT U.S. TOBACCO FARMERS OR CIGARETTE FACTORY WORKERS 1 (2007),
http://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0150.pdf (arguing that tax increases on cigarettes will
not hurt U.S. tobacco farmers because of the demand for tobacco abroad).
160. CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, FEDERAL CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX INCREASES:
ESTIMATED NEW REVENUES, COST SAVINGS, AND OTHER BENEFITS & EFFECTS 1 (2007),
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0149.pdf.
161. Altman et al., supra note 12, at 196-97 (demonstrating that tobacco farmers and public health
groups both support an excise tax on cigarettes and can work together to allocate tax revenues to support
diversification).
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growing tobacco" and think that "taxpayers should help pay for such programs. ' ' 62
Finally, a diversification effort funded by excise taxes could "decrease public and
policy-maker resistance to tobacco control., 163 By offering support for an excise
tax, tobacco farmers, tobacco control activists, and the public could present a united
front against the industry. 164
3. Using an Excise Tax as a Litmus Test of the Federal Government's True
Objectives
An excise tax on cigarettes generates multiple benefits. It can be used to fund
research on alternative crops and subsidize tobacco farmers as they transition out of
growing tobacco while simultaneously decreasing tobacco consumption. 65 Only
the tobacco industry seems to oppose excise taxes on cigarettes.166 Thus, excise
taxes become a litmus test of the federal government's commitment to tobacco
control.
If the federal government's primary objective is to support the tobacco
industry, then the government will reject an excise tax, even though such a tax can
reduce tobacco consumption and help farmers transition out of growing tobacco.
However, if the government does not aim to support the tobacco industry, then it
may be willing to consider using an excise tax to assist farmers, despite the
opposition of the tobacco industry. Identifying the government's intentions with
respect to the industry will be crucial for shaping future policies regarding tobacco
farmers.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, tobacco control in the United States has been adversarial,1 67 a
warranted approach in light of the tobacco industry's record of distortion and
deception.' 68 However, modern anti-tobacco activists need new weapons in their
162. David G. Altman et al., Tobacco Farming and Public Health: Attitudes of the General Public,
53 J. SOC. ISSUES 113, 121 (1997).
163. Altman et al., supra note 12, at 196.
164. Contrary to what the industry would have farmers believe, an excise tax on cigarettes is
beneficial for farmers in their efforts to diversify. Altman et al., supra note 12, at 197. See also Vestal,
supra note 45, at 889 n.70 (citation omitted) (noting that the Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative
Association recently supported an excise tax that was opposed by the Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corporation).
165. Bassuk, supra note 156.
166. See sources cited supra note 164.
167. DERTHICK, supra note 75, at 209. Pregon, supra note 7, at 467 (describing the tobacco control
policy of the United States as an "all-out war against the tobacco industry"). W. Kip Viscusi,
Constructive Cigarette Regulation, 47 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1099 (1998) (explaining that the approach of the
Food and Drug Administration towards tobacco control has been adversarial).
168. United States v. Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding that tobacco
companies deliberately deceived consumers about the health risks of smoking to market their products).
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arsenal, and it may come as a surprise that a powerful new tactic relies on
cooperation with tobacco farmers rather than the more traditional strategy of attack.
Creating room for tobacco farmers in an anti-tobacco policy does not mean
that tobacco control activists must temper their convictions to reduce or eliminate
the use of tobacco products. It simply means that activists must be willing to
understand the consequences to farmers of an anti-tobacco policy and consider
avenues of tobacco control that reflect that understanding. Activists must
acknowledge that it is possible to discontinue tobacco production without
destroying the lives of farmers 169 by using an excise tax on cigarettes to fund
alternative crop research and subsidize diversification, job training, and education.
By distinguishing farmers from the industry as a whole and persuading
farmers that the industry does not have their best interests in mind, tobacco control
advocates can create space for a powerful, new collaboration with farmers.
Aligning the interests of the public health community and tobacco farmers will
usher in a new era of cooperation, empower both groups, and further the public
health goal of reducing tobacco consumption.
See also Yussuf Saloojee & Elif Dagli, Tobacco Industry Tactics for Resisting Public Policy on Health,
78 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 902, 902-03 (2000), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/bulletin/2000/Number/207/78(7)902-9 10.pdf (discussing the tobacco
companies' practice of concealing documents that implicate the companies' knowledge of the harm
caused by cigarettes); Brian H. Barr, Note, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds: The Improper Assessment of Punitive
Damages for an Entire Class ofInjured Smokers, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 787, 826 (2001) ("The industry
simply ignored the health and safety of its consumers and affirmatively lied to the users of its products
about the negative health effects of smoking."); World Health Org., Dismantling Tobacco Industry
Myths ("The tobacco industry has repeatedly misled and misinformed the public about the health risks
and dangers of second-hand tobacco smoke and on the economic impact of smoking bans."),
http://www.who.int/tobacco/communications/events/wntd/2007/dismantling/en (last visited Feb. 13,
2008).
169. Altman et al., supra note 12, at 197 ("Our goal should not be to save tobacco, but to save those
whose livelihoods depend on tobacco.").
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